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The Common European Asylum System: Inconsistent, Incoherent and Lacking 
Credibility 
 
By Liza Schuster 
 
The refugee crisis of 2015 put the European Union’s warm words about cooperation 
to the ultimate ‘stress test’, and it could hardly be said to have passed with flying 
colours.  
 
Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty against the backdrop of the Yugoslav wars, 
the EU has been committed to the development of a common asylum policy. This went 
on to become a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) including: 
• A common definition of who qualifies as entitled to refugee status and 
subsidiary protection  
• A mechanism to offer temporary protection rapidly in situations where large 
numbers of refugees arrive in a relatively short period of time (Temporary 
Protection Directive) 
• Common standards of reception for those claiming asylum  
• Common procedures for the examination, granting and withdrawal of protection  
• A mechanism for establishing which state is responsible for examining a claim 
(the Dublin Regulation)  
• Common definition of who may be removed from the territory of Member States 
and under what conditions  
 
Yet we still see significant differences in all these areas, impacting the chances of 
receiving protection. Although perfectly suited to deal with the spike in arrivals in 2016, 
the TPD has not been used; reception conditions range from leaving thousands to 
camp in the centre of capital cities, to housing new arrivals in hostels to detaining them 
in closed camps with insufficient food, medical care, legal advice or sanitary facilities. 
The Dublin Regulation has been amended four times, but is still in force despite clear 
evidence it is costly and utterly pointless (all states exchange roughly the same 
number of asylum seekers, so it provides no benefit, but considerable costs, to states 
and causes huge problems for asylum seekers). 
 
But perhaps the starkest evidence of the failure of the common asylum system is the 
difference in recognition and deportation rates across the EU. Recognition rates vary 
across the EU from 6 per cent (Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia) – 80 per cent (Ireland) 
and while some states deport aggressively to countries in conflict such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq, others declare those countries unsafe. These differences make a mockery 
of the principles on which the European asylum system rests. The key elements of the 
common asylum system – the Qualifications Directive, the Procedures Directive, the 
Reception Directive, the Returns Directive and above all, the incorrigible Dublin 
Regulation – all pre-suppose that every asylum seeker has a fair and equal opportunity 
to have his or her case heard, and that that case will be treated equally by all member 
states, but this is patently not the case. People with the same fears and subject to the 
same risks on return will or will not access protection depending on where they make 
a claim. 
 
The treatment of Afghans illustrates this very well. After Syrians (33 per cent /175,855), 
Afghans were the second largest national group (19 per cent /100,705) to receive 
protection in the EU in 2017. Across all EU countries, the discrepancy in recognition 
rates is huge. In the first six months of 2017, rates vary from 0.5 per cent in Bulgaria 
and less than 10 per cent in Hungary to more than 80 per cent in Spain, France, 
Luxemburg and Italy. It cannot be that those with the strongest cases for recognition 
target particular countries, while those who are not at risk on return congregate in 
Bulgaria or other East European countries. Almost a third of Afghans arriving in Europe 
(31 per cent) applied for asylum in Germany, and 63 per cent of Afghans who received 
protection in Europe, received it in Germany, even though the recognition rate for 
Afghans in Germany (47 per cent) was below the European average of 56 per cent for 
this nationality (there are also significant differences in recognition rates between 
German federal states). 
 
The primary ground for recognition as a refugee remains individual persecution ‘for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion’ (Art.1 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees). However, the 
Qualifications Directive (QD) specified that those who did not meet those criteria would 
be eligible for subsidiary protection where that person would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, that is: the death penalty or execution; 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; serious and individual threat 
to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict.  
All Member States rely on the QD definition, UNHCR eligibility guidelines and/or 
relevant jurisprudence. The European Asylum Support Office also produces Country 
of Origin Information reports that describe conditions in countries of origin and the 
risks faced by those returned. Despite this, Afghanistan is variously considered by 
Member States as wholly unsafe, or as unsafe in some areas. In the latter case, this 
enables states to argue that the refugee did not need to seek international protection 
but could have ‘internally relocated’ to another province or city, most often citing Kabul 
or Mazar-i-Sharif and to justify deportations of Afghans to Kabul.  
 
It is possible that those from particular ethnic groups (Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek) 
or particular provinces will be drawn to particular countries where there are established 
communities, as suggested by network or chain migration theories. According to this 
explanation, Member States with a high proportion of Hazara applicants (a minority 
persecuted for their ethnicity and religion) would have higher recognition rates.  Or 
those Member States with high numbers of Afghans from Bamyan or Panshir, 
provinces with low levels of conflict, would have low recognition rates. There is 
insufficient data to test this hypothesis and it would still not explain the extremely low 
rates in Eastern Europe, ie in transit countries, before people head to separate 
destinations.  
 
An alternative suggestion – that those receiving most applications from Afghanistan 
are most likely to be restrictive in order to deter future arrivals – does not stand up. In 
absolute terms, Germany had by far the highest the number of Afghan applications, 
but is about average in terms of recognition rates. France received the second highest 
number of applications (6,555) from Afghanistan and granted protection to more than 
80 per cent. Switzerland and Bulgaria received 1180 and 1050 respectively, but the 
recognition rate in Switzerland was 90 per cent while in Bulgaria it was less than 1 per 
cent. 
 
The variation in recognition rates is more likely due to divergent interpretation of the 
relevant directives. According to a 2015 study by the European Asylum Support Office, 
Art.15(c) of the QD ‘is the provision where the most diverging interpretations and 
practices could be identified in the Member States’. On 21 March 2018, the highest 
Dutch administrative court found that while ‘[t]he general security situation in 
Afghanistan is worrying and has worsened in some provinces’ it was nonetheless safe 
to deport Afghans. Less than two weeks later, on 3 April, the administrative court of 
appeal in Lyon France, declared that Afghans should not be returned to European 
countries that had rejected their applications because of the risk that they would be 
returned to Afghanistan and instead should re-examine their claims. The Upper 
Tribunal in the UK decided in May that single young men could be returned to Kabul, 
while Italy has declared the whole country unsafe. 
 
Decisions on the credibility of individual asylum claims rest on the coherence and 
consistency of those claims. They are expected to be internally and externally 
coherent, and reasonable. The facts of the case should not contradict each other and 
they should be consistent with what is known of the situation in the country of origin. 
The actions described should be reasonable in the circumstances. Evaluating the 
credibility of the European asylum system, the same criteria should apply.  
Currently eight EU Member States do not return Afghans to their ‘country of origin’ 
(Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta and 
Portugal), somewhat ironic given that a significant number of Afghan asylum seekers 
have been born raised in exile in Iran and Pakistan, countries where they face 
discrimination and exclusion. Most of them don’t return them because they have too 
few Afghan asylum seekers to justify the cost. Another group of Member States do not 
apply the Dublin regulation to return Afghans to other EU Member States who do 
deport to Afghanistan, while still others no not deport directly to Afghanistan but do 
return to other Member States, even where that person is at risk of return. Aside from 
the inconsistency of these recognition processes – both within and between Member 
States – in too many cases, the decisions taken are also inconsistent with the situation 
in Afghanistan and do not reflect the deteriorating security situation. 
 
Kabul has become the most dangerous province in Afghanistan with 1,831 civilian 
casualties (479 deaths and 1,352 injured) in 2017, 88 per cent as a result of suicide 
and complex attacks carried out by Anti-Government Elements in Kabul city (a recent 
Human Rights Watch report detailed the devastating impact of these casualties in a 
country where existing medical facilities are stretched to breaking point and there is 
no meaningful social support, urgently needed since many of those affected will be 
the sole breadwinners for their families).  
 
UNHCR guidelines on internal relocation note the importance of social networks and 
of the possibility of finding work and accommodation, but Afghans, including families 
with small children, who have grown up in exile and have no contacts in Kabul are 
returned there from Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Even for young single men, most 
often the target of deportation procedures, accessing employment and or 
accommodation is close to impossible without social networks.  
 
Given an unemployment rate of approximately 45 per cent, and a system that relies 
almost exclusively on personal contacts (especially for unskilled work), it is simply not 
possible for an Afghan without contacts or resources to find work. And given the 
security situation and cultural context, it is equally difficult for a single man without 
resources to find more than the most basic, temporary accommodation. Single men 
without families are treated with suspicion and mistrust. 
 
A note from the European Commission on the subject of ‘enhancing cooperation on 
migration, mobility and readmission with Afghanistan’ recognised ‘the worsening 
security situation and threats to which people are exposed’ but nonetheless argued 
that ‘Despite this, more than 80,000 persons could potentially need to be returned in 
the near future’. In the light of the risks on return to Afghanistan and the difficulties 
facing those returned, there is considerable resistance to being returned among 
rejected asylum seekers. In addition, the Ministry for Refugees and Repatriation has 
not cooperated enthusiastically in the forced return of their nationals.  
 
Although in 2016, the number of Afghans refused protection by the EU jumped from 
approximately 20,000 annually to 44,000, the numbers forcibly returned are relatively 
low – in 2016, forced returns from Europe were just over 500, and in 2017, 720. While 
the Afghan government is frequently blamed for these low numbers, in reality forced 
removals are difficult to carry out, there are networks of campaigners across Europe 
supporting Afghans, and Member States have been forced to suspend deportations in 
the wake of attacks, such as that near the German Embassy in May 2017, which led 
to its evacuation for a number of months. The EU delegation has cut back its personnel 
from 34 to 10, and all EU Member States have closed their consular services, retaining 
only skeleton staff. 
 
As a result, in spite of conditions in Afghanistan, in 2016 EU Member States took 
advantage of the Brussels Donor Conference, when the international community 
pledged continued aid to Afghanistan to try to improve deportation rates to 
Afghanistan. The Joint Way Forward is an agreement obliging the Afghan government 
to facilitate returns and prevent irregular migration in exchange for an ‘incentive 
package’. It was signed on the eve of the conference, following extreme pressure from 
the EU ambassador to Afghanistan and a handful of EU Member States, including 
warnings that donor states would be unlikely to contribute generously if it was not 
signed.  
 
There are two distinct but related issues here: the diverse probabilities of receiving 
protection in the EU depending on the country in which one makes a claim, and the 
credibility of decisions that are made. There is currently no European institution 
implementing these directives or ensuring that criteria are uniformly applied – instead 
considerable discretion remains at national level, with the result that where one makes 
one’s claim matters enormously, a fact ignored by the Dublin regulation. This evident 
injustice is amplified by the Dublin regulation which prevents asylum seekers from 
choosing where to make their claim.  Such discrepancies in recognition rates have 
important consequences for asylum seekers, in terms of whether they are condemned 
to leave without papers and excluded from the rights and protections enjoyed by others 
in the same situation in other countries, but also in terms of the risk of being removed 
to their country of origin, a country still in conflict. So for the CEAS to have credibility 
and ensure those who need protection receive it, it needs to harmonise its decision-
making to the highest standards applying in the EU pertaining in the EU. 
 
